Does development finance pose an additional risk to monetary policy? by Haruna, Issahaku et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does development finance pose an
additional risk to monetary policy?
Haruna, Issahaku and Harvey, Simon K. and Abor, Joshua
Y.
University for Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana
2 February 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101637/
MPRA Paper No. 101637, posted 08 Jul 2020 21:24 UTC
DOES DEVELOPMENT FINANCE POSE AN ADDITIONAL RISK TO MONETARY 
POLICY? 
 
Haruna Issahakua (Corresponding Author), Simon K. Harveyb and Joshua Y. Aborc 
a Department of Economics and Entrepreneurship Development, University for 
Development Studies, Ghana. 
b,c Department of Finance, University of Ghana Business School, College of Humanities, 
University of Ghana. 
Email Address of Corresponding Author: iharuna@uds.edu.gh or 
harusconer@yahoo.com 
 
  
DOES DEVELOPMENT FINANCE POSE AN ADDITIONAL RISK TO MONETARY 
POLICY? 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates whether remittances pose an extra risk to macroeconomic policy 
management, and the role, if any, the financial system can play in the interaction between 
remittances and monetary policy. We employ panel data for 106 developing countries from 
1970 to 2013. Results from the Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model reveal that 
remittance volatility reduces macroeconomic risk in developing countries, at the same time, it 
stimulates a reduction in domestic interest rates. This finding remains robust to alternative 
specifications of remittance volatility, monetary policy risk, and to variations in the degree of 
financial development.  The key lesson from the study is that developing countries can 
leverage the positive impact of remittances in reducing macroeconomic instability by 
implementing remittance inducing policies.  
 JEL classification: F33, F34, F35, O11 
 Keywords: remittances, monetary policy, developing countries, financial development, 
Panel Vector Auto Regression (PVAR). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Remittances have become an important source of development finance. Thus, it is not 
surprising that remittances have engaged the attention of researchers, policy makers, global 
development financial institutions and other development partners. While policymakers 
continue to look to researchers for ideas to use remittances more effectively, research in this 
area has been clustered around the microeconomic implications of remittances (Ncube and 
Brixiova, 2013). These micro-level studies focus on the role of remittances in poverty 
reduction (Acosta et al., 2008, 2007; Adams Jr, 2004; Adams and Page, 2005; Gupta et al., 
2009), child growth (Antón, 2010; Carletto et al., 2011; Mansuri, 2006), employment 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; McCormick and Wahba, 2000; Taylor, 1999), and 
household expenditures and investment (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010; Adams, 2006; Yang, 
2008), to name a few.  
Thus, a gap remains in the empirical literature regarding the macroeconomic implications of 
remittances. Even the limited research on the macro-level impact of remittances has focused 
mainly on remittances’ impact on growth (Barajas et al., 2009; Chami et al., 2012; Fayissa 
and Nsiah, 2010; Ncube and Brixiova, 2013; Nsiah and Fayissa, 2011; Pradhan et al., 2008; 
Waheed, 2004). Nonetheless, for policymakers in both developing and emerging economies, 
gaining insight into the macroeconomic influence of remittances is fundamental for putting 
their countries on the path towards accelerated and pro-poor growth (Ncube and Brixiova, 
2013). 
In particular, the impact of remittances on monetary policy seems to have eluded the attention 
of empirical researchers, which has resulted in a limited understanding of the relationship 
between remittances and monetary policy (Vacaflores, 2012). However, economists have 
recently begun to test the existence of the link between remittances and monetary policy 
(Adenutsi and Ahortor, 2008; Chami et al., 2008; Mandelman and Zlate, 2012; Ruiz and 
Vargas-Silva, 2010; Vacaflores, 2012). As limited as the research in this field is, the evidence 
that has been uncovered has been rather contradictory. For instance, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 
(2010) examine the Mexican context and find no significant relationship between remittances 
and domestic monetary policy, although Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) had earlier revealed a 
significant relationship between monetary policy variables and remittances in Ghana.  
This confusion has been exacerbated by the proposition by Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2010: 
p.174) that remittances that are small relative to the size of the economy will not have an 
impact on monetary policy. ‘If these flows are not large and/or not significant given the total 
size of the economy, then their impact on variables such as inflation, exchange rates and 
output will be minimal’. However, if the size of remittances is so important, then why would 
they matter to monetary policy in a small economy, such as Ghana’s, in which they 
constitute only 0.4% of GDP and why would they be rather insignificant in Mexico where 
remittances add up to approximately 2.0% of GDP? 
Furthermore, the previous literature on the interaction of monetary policy and remittances 
consists mostly of single-country studies: El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) focused on Egypt, 
Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) on Ghana, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2010) on Mexico, and 
Mandelman (2013) on the Philippines. The problem with single-country studies is that they 
do not allow for wider applicability of the knowledge they generate. The previous literature 
on the subject on the whole also does not allow for the potential moderating effect of 
financial development in the remittance-monetary policy nexus. For instance, financial 
markets are known to play an intermediary function in the link between capital flows and 
economic growth (Agbloyor et al., 2014; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013). However, will this 
moderating role hold in the case of the monetary policy-remittance link? This question is 
one of the unresolved issues on the topic. 
Notwithstanding the perceived linkages among macroeconomic policy, remittances and the 
financial system, financial and development economists have been largely silent on this 
tripartite nexus. In our literature search in connection with this study, we have yet to 
encounter a study that examines the interactive effect of monetary policy and remittances on 
financial development and the interactive effect of remittances and the financial system on 
monetary policy efficiency. Thus, we have been presented with a fertile opportunity for 
research, and the present study exploits this opportunity and fills this void.  
In this paper, we employ Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR) to overcome endogeneity 
problems; to establish causality among monetary policy, remittances and other 
macroeconomic variables; and to generate orthogonalised impulse responses. We then use 
generalised impulse responses to identify the effects of remittance shocks on monetary 
policy. Unlike the usual Cholesky impulse responses, the use of generalised impulse 
responses helps us generate shocks that do not vary with the variable ordering.  
We employ country-level panel data (annual) from 106 developing countries to analyse the 
dynamics of monetary policy decisions and remittance inflows. In the main, we investigate 
how remittance volatility affects monetary policy volatility. We argue that if remittances 
flows are indeed countercyclical to the domestic economy, then remittance volatility must be 
negatively related to the monetary policy rate and to monetary policy rate volatility. In 
addition, a contractionary domestic monetary policy must trigger a remittance inflow that is 
consistent with the countercyclical view of remittances. To test the first hypothesis, we 
compute the five-year rolling standard deviation of remittances and the monetary policy rate 
and model them in a PVAR framework. To test the second hypothesis, we simulate 
monetary contraction following the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model within the 
framework of Cholesky innovations and orthogonalised generalised impulse response 
functions. In so doing, we document a significant negative relationship between remittances 
and remittance volatility, on one hand, and monetary policy rate and monetary policy 
volatility, on the other. In addition, controlling for the level of financial development and the 
magnitude of remittances does not nullify this relationship, thus supporting our claim that 
remittance volatility reduces both domestic interest rates and monetary policy risk. 
Our paper contributes in a number of ways to the financial economics discipline. First, the 
use of PVAR helps us to analyse the dynamics of domestic monetary policy and remittances, 
in addition to country-specific fixed effects at the same time. Second, the use of 
orthogonalised impulse responses enables us to uniquely isolate the impact of shocks from 
each of the system variables on the other variables, one at a time.  
Our paper further extends the frontiers of knowledge in financial economics by presenting 
new evidence showing that a contractionary domestic monetary policy will activate the 
inflow of remittances. We also add to those recent panel data studies that confirm a causal 
connection between monetary policy and remittances (see, Termos et al., 2013; Vacaflores, 
2012). Although most previous studies focus on remittances and monetary policy levels, we 
take the step further to examine the dynamics in the volatilities of the two variables. In 
particular, we find that remittances and remittance volatility reduce the domestic interest rate 
and monetary volatility. Our results are in line with Craigwell et al. (2010) and Bugamelli 
and PaternÒ (2011), who find that remittances reduce receiving countries’ macroeconomic 
risks. 
Our paper also contributes to the recent debate on the intermediary function of financial 
development in the link between capital flows and growth (see, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2009; Ramirez, 2013). This literature shows that remittances substitute for financial markets 
in economic growth when capital markets are shallow. Our results are consistent with this 
literature and scales up the analysis to cover how finance enhances the mitigating impact of 
remittances on economic policy risk.  
This paper is also related to Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011), who analyse the impact of 
remittances on output volatility. These authors employ an instrumental variable approach to 
establish causality between the two variables. Unlike Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011), 
however, we explore the effects of remittances on interest rates and monetary policy risk. 
We argue that output is only an objective of monetary policy and that a more direct 
assessment of the effect of remittances on monetary conditions is therefore required. In 
addition, whereas Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011) focus on remittances, we examine both 
remittances and remittance volatility. In terms of measurement, whereas Bugamelli and 
PaternÒ (2011) measure volatility in terms of deviations from the mean, we employ five-
year rolling standard deviations to diminish the distortionary impact of outliers. Craigwell et 
al. (2010) also assess the association among remittance, output, investment and consumption 
volatility using a panel fixed effects methodology. However, their methodology does not 
allow them to generate impulse responses, which we see as critical for separating the effects 
of remittance shocks from shocks related to economic fundamentals. Unlike Craigwell et al. 
(2010) we interact remittances with financial development to assess remittances’ impact on 
macroeconomic policy impulses. Within this framework, we uncover a potential moderating 
role of financial markets in reducing volatilities in both monetary policy and remittances. 
We are further able to simulate the influence of contractionary monetary policy on 
remittance behaviour. 
Lastly, from a theoretical standpoint, this study lays the foundation for the development of 
theory on the tripartite nexus of monetary policy-remittances-financial development. 
Uncovering the theoretical underpinnings of this tripartite nexus will help developing 
countries’ policymakers to devise policies that will let them get the most out of monetary 
policy, remittances, and financial development for socio-economic advancement. The study 
seeks to answer the following three main questions. (1) Do remittances pose additional 
macroeconomic (monetary policy) risk in developing countries? (2) Do monetary conditions 
in the recipient country affect remittance inflows? (3) What role does the financial system 
play in the link between monetary policy and remittances? 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we specify our Panel 
Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model and describe the variables used. In Section 3, we 
present our results and a discussion on diagnostic exercises, PVAR estimates, and the 
Cholesky and generalised impulse responses. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
2.1 The Model 
Economists model economic issues in multilateral interdependency settings in two main 
ways (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). The first option is to develop dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. However, although well-specified DSGE models 
provide precise solutions to policy questions and simplify the welfare implications of 
economic policy (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013), their restrictive assumptions make them 
largely unsuitable for analysing economic issues in a developing country context. In 
particular, assumptions such as optimal risk sharing, consumption smoothening, 
homogenous labour markets, full employment, complete markets and rationality that anchor 
a typical DSGE model are largely untenable in the context of developing countries (Senbeta, 
2011). Moreover, certain of the restrictions of the DSGE are often not consistent with the 
distributional characteristics of the dataset, with the consequence that policy 
recommendations from such models might be misleading (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013).  
The second option is to develop Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) models that avoid 
most of the restrictive assumptions made in the DSGE models. The PVAR advantage 
derives from the advantages of mother VAR models. First, all variables can be treated as 
endogenous, but there is also the added flexibility for including truly exogenous variables. 
Thus, PVARs resolve endogeneity, one of the most serious problems of econometric time 
series and panel data analysis. Second, PVARs facilitate the analysis of the impact of 
innovations, making room for interactions among variables and thus producing dynamic 
solutions that are not often attainable via OLS and other standard models (Li et al., 2012). 
The set of restrictions required in modelling dynamic interdependencies using PVARs is not 
so limiting as in DSGE models (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). Forecasts from VAR models 
are often more accurate than forecasts from traditional structural models. PVARs can 
accommodate multiple cointegration vectors, as opposed to Johansen (1988), unlike the 
maximum likelihood cointegration procedure and the Johansen and Juselius (1990) test for 
co-integration (Ericsson and Irandoust, 2004). PVARs permit the inclusion of fixed effects 
that capture country-specific time-invariant effects as well as global time-invariant effects, 
and they can effectively handle short time dimensions due to extra degrees of freedom 
gained from the inclusion of cross-sections; moreover, by using impulse response functions, 
PVARs can show delayed effects on (and of) each variable in the system (Grossmann et al., 
2014). 
The PVAR model is a mixture of the conventional VAR approach – in which all variables 
are considered endogenous a priori – and the panel data approach in which unobserved 
individual heterogeneous effects are accommodated. The baseline PVAR model is 
represented below.         ( )  ∑                     (1) 
 
where Yit is a vector of K endogenous variables for each country, i=1,…, N over t = 1,…,T 
time periods. In this study, Yit is given as: 
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All variables are defined in Table 1. Boi(t) captures all deterministic components (including 
constants, seasonal dummies, etc.), Yit-k are lagged values of the endogenous variables, and 
uit is a K x 1 vector of random disturbances given by     [             ]      (   ). αit 
and Boi(t) are allowed to be cross-sectionally dependent. In the event that exogenous 
variables are present, equation (1) becomes: 
        ( )  ∑                ( )           (2) 
 
where Di,t are K x M matrices for each lag j= 1,.., q, and Rit is an M x 1 vector of exogenous 
variables. 
Equations (1) and (2) have three main distinguishing characteristics. First, they have 
Dynamic Interdependencies, which are captured by incorporating the lagged values of the 
endogenous variables. Second, they have Static Interdependencies, where uit are allowed to 
be correlated with the cross-sectional dimension i. Cross-sectional Heterogeneity, where the 
intercept and slope parameters and the variances of the shocks are permitted to vary across 
units (countries).  
Alternatively, based on Love and Zicchino (2006), we might also specify the PVAR in 
reduced form as follows: 
        ∑                                    (3) 
 
The inclusion of exogenous variables (Ri) differentiates equation (3) above from the 
specification by Love and Zicchino (2006). Whereas fi captures fixed effects–country-
specific unobservable time-invariant effects, dc,t captures country-specific time dummies that 
represent macro shocks specific to each country, and τo is a vector of constants. 
2.2 Empirical Specification of the Model 
Based on equations (1) and (2), we specify the model equations involving remittance and 
monetary policy in this section, as they are the two most important variables in this study. 
The model equations involving these two variables are specified below. Monetary policy risk 
can be specified as a function of the lags of endogenous variables while controlling for 
country-specific fixed and time specific effects as follows: 
        ∑                  ∑                    ∑                  
∑                 ∑                ∑                ∑                 
∑                ∑                  ∑                                
(8) 
i is the country subscript while t is a time subscript; σrMPRit is the monetary policy risk for 
country i at time t; σrREMITit-j is the lag of remittance volatility; REERit-j is the lag of the real 
effective exchange rate; TRADEit-j is the lag of economic openness, proxied by the share of 
trade in GDP; LCPIit-j is the lag of inflation, proxied by the logarithm of the consumer price 
index; LGDPit-j is the lag of the log of real GDP; LGDPgit-j is the lag of the real GDP growth 
rate; DCPSit-j is the lag of financial development, proxied by total credit provided by the 
financial sector as a proportion of GDP; MPR.FDit-j is an interaction term between monetary 
policy and financial development; REMIT.FDit-j is an interaction term between remittances 
and financial development; fi captures the country i-specific intercept representing country-
specific fixed effects; dt captures time dummies; and eit is the noise error term. 
Similarly, remittance volatility can be specified as the main dependent variable as follows.  
          ∑                 ∑                   ∑                 
∑                 ∑                ∑                ∑                
 ∑                ∑                  ∑                                  
           (9) 
where all variables are as defined under equation (8) above. 
2.3 Data and Variable Selection 
Apart from the monetary policy rate (MPR), which was obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS), and Monetary Freedom 
(MONEY_FREEDOM), which was obtained from the Heritage Foundation (HF), all other 
variables were sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). We 
include 106 developing countries around the world in our sample, and these countries are 
listed in Table A1 in the appendix. We use an unbalanced panel (annual data) from 1970 to 
2013. Two main factors informed our selection of countries for the study. First and 
foremost, in deciding which countries are in the ‘Developing Country’ category we used the 
IMF and World Bank list of developing countries, which is the most widely accepted 
classification of countries. Secondly, for a country to be selected for the study, it must have 
sufficient data for the main variables for the study, including remittances, monetary policy 
rate and/or the lending interest, and financial development (private credit as a ratio of GDP). 
The central bank’s monetary policy rate (MPR) is used as the main measure of monetary 
policy. We use this variable because it reflects the reactions of the monetary authorities to 
domestic and international economic conditions. The policy rate is also considered the 
indicative interest rate in the domestic economy, and all other interest rates are fixed with 
respect to it. To capture monetary policy risk we compute the standard deviations of the 
policy rate (σrMPR) with a five-year rolling window and also use the normal standard 
deviation (σsMPR) (deviations from the mean) for robustness checks. Further robustness 
checks are conducted later using the five-year moving variance (σr2MPR) and normal 
variance (σs2MPR) in the MPR. 
We measure remittances (REMIT) as the share of total international remittance inflows in 
GDP. Analogously, we measure remittance risk (volatility) in four similar ways – as the five-
year moving standard deviation of remittances (σrREMIT), as the normal standard deviation 
of remittances (σsREMIT), as the five-year rolling variance of remittances (σr2REMIT), and as 
the normal variance of remittances (σs2REMIT). Standard deviations of remittances have been 
employed in previous studies by Craigwell et al. (2010) and (Bugamelli and PaternÒ, 2011). 
Inflation is proxied by the log of the CPI, and the five-year rolling standard deviation of CPI is 
used to proxy for economic (in)stability. We use the log of GDP to measure market size and 
the growth rate of GDP as a measure of changes in economic fortunes (business cycle 
effects). The description of all of the variables, data sources and associated notations are 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable  Notation Description  Data 
Source 
Economic Openness TRADE Total trade as a ratio of GDP WDI 
Financial Development DCPS Domestic credit to the private sector as a 
ratio of GDP 
WDI 
Remittances (2) LREMITT Logarithm of total remittance receipts  WDI 
Remittances (1) REMIT Personal remittances as a ratio of GDP WDI 
Monetary Policy Rate MPR The central bank’s policy rate IFS 
Lending Interest Rate LRATE Logarithm of the lending interest rate WDI 
Inflation Rate LCPI Logarithm of the consumer price index (CPI) WDI 
Market Size LGDP Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) WDI 
Economic Business Cycles GDPg Growth rate of GDP WDI 
Foreign Direct Investment FDI Foreign direct investment as a ratio of GDP WDI 
Macroeconomic (in)stability (1) 
 
Five-year rolling standard deviation of the 
CPI 
WDI 
Macroeconomic (in)stability (2) 
 
Standard deviation of the CPI calculated in 
the standard manner 
WDI 
Macroeconomic (in)stability (3) 
 
Five-year rolling variance of remittances as a 
ratio of GDP 
WDI 
Macroeconomic (in)stability (4) 
 
Variance of remittances as a ratio of GDP 
calculated in the standard manner 
WDI 
Monetary Policy Risk (1) 
 
Five-year rolling standard deviation of the 
monetary policy rate 
WDI 
Monetary Policy Risk (2) 
 
Standard deviation of the monetary policy 
rate calculated in the standard manner 
WDI 
Monetary Policy Risk (3) 
 
Five-year rolling variance of the monetary 
policy rate 
WDI 
Monetary Policy Risk (4) 
 
Variance of the monetary policy rate 
calculated in the standard manner 
WDI 
Monetary Policy Risk (5) 
 
Five-year rolling variance of the lending 
interest rate 
WDI 
Remittance Risk (1) 
 
Five-year rolling standard deviation of 
remittances 
WDI 
Remittance Risk (2) 
 
Standard deviation of remittances calculated 
in the standard manner 
WDI 
Remittance Risk (3) 
 
Five-year rolling variance of remittances as a 
ratio of GDP  
WDI 
Remittance Risk (4) 
 
Variance of remittances calculated in the 
standard manner 
WDI 
Monetary Freedom MONEY_FREE
DOM 
Heritage Foundation’s (HF) measure of 
monetary freedom 
HF 
Money Supply LBMS Logarithm of broad money supply as a ratio 
of GDP 
WDI 
LCPIr
LCPIs
LCPIr
2
LCPIs
2
MPRr
MPRs
MPRr
2
MPRs
2
LRATEr
2
REMITr
REMITs
REMITr
2
REMITs
2
Note: IFS is International Financial Statistics, WDI is World Development Indicators, and HF is Heritage 
Foundation 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. Because the mean is susceptible to distortions 
from outliers, we use the median of the distribution for our discussion. Median consumer 
inflation (CPI) is quite high (46.44), which signals high commodity prices in developing 
countries. The measure of the interest rate, the monetary policy rate (MPR), has a high 
median value, indicating the high cost of funds in the developing world. Remittances as a 
percentage of GDP is 1.86, which signals the increasing significance of remittances as a 
source of development finance in developing economies. When channelled properly, these 
receipts could facilitate economic development by increasing GDP growth (GDPg) above 
the median value of 4.28%. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
   Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum  Std. 
Dev. 
Jarque-
Bera 
Prob Obs 
CPI 48.64  46.44 288.65 0.00 37.59 119.66  0.00  3471 
DCPS 30.06 23.72 165.72 0.80 23.89 6464.97 0.00 3727 
FDI 3.10 1.62  53.81 0.06 5.05 90601.72 0.00 3608 
MPR 12.62 8.99 200.00 0.020 16.33 111015.40 0.00  654 
REMIT 4.69 1.86 106.48 0.00 9.02 247713.10 0.00 3197 
GDPg 3.85 4.28 88.96 -5.02E+01 5.84 69195.00 0.00 3902 
TRADE 75.26 68.59 375.38 6.32 40.12 2080.32 0.00 3715 
Note 1: MPR is Monetary Policy Rate; REMIT is Remittances; GDPg is Gross Domestic Product growth; CPI 
is Consumer Price Index; FDI is Foreign Direct Investment; TRADE is total trade; and DCPS is Domestic 
Credit Provided to the Private Sector. 
3.1 Model Selection and Estimation 
The criteria for model selection is presented in Table 3. Using the model selection criteria 
suggested by Andrews and Lu (2001), the preferred model is a first-order panel VAR 
because it yields the minimum values for MBIC, MAIC and MHQ. On the basis of the 
results of the model selection criteria (Table 3), we fit a first-order panel VAR. 
Table 3: Selection Order Criteria 
Lag MBIC MAIC MHQ 
1 -273.4472 -85.9615 -161.5667 
2 -184.3375 -59.3469 -109.7505 
3 -94.8601 -32.3649 -57.5666 
Note: MBIC is Modified Bayesian Criteria, MAIC is Modified Akaike Information Criteria, and MHQ is 
Modified Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria. 
 
Our PVAR models are all exactly identified, and for that reason, Hansen’s J statistic of over- 
identifying restrictions is not computed. Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions is used 
to produce 5% error bands for impulse response functions. 
3.2 Results of Panel Unit Root Test 
In time series and panel data analyses, it is important to explore the order of variable 
integration. The stationarity status (the order of integration) of the variables helps to choose 
the appropriate model for estimating the coefficients. There are advantages to deploying 
panel unit root tests over individual time series-based unit root tests. First, panel data-based 
unit root tests have more statistical power than their univariate counterparts. In a panel 
setting, the traditional Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) has low power identifying 
stationarity, particularly in short panels. Second, panel unit root tests are less restrictive and 
allow for fixed effects at the country level as well as time variations in the parameters across 
panels. Moreover, panel data techniques provide a suite of estimation options ranging from 
estimation with no trend and no constant, to estimations with a deterministic trend and a 
constant, and testing for common time effects. These techniques provide a high degree of 
flexibility in estimating parameters.  
The results from Table 4 show that, apart from the Consumer Price Index (CPI), all variables 
are integrated of order I(0). The CPI is integrated of order I(1). In addition, the logarithmic 
(logs) transformation of CPI is stationary at level. We employ the logs of CPI in our 
estimation, which implies that all variables used for our estimations do not follow a unit root 
process and suggests that it is unlikely that a unique state of long-run equilibrium for the 
system variables exists. The results from unreported cointegration tests confirm the non-
existence of a unique long-run relationship. 
Table 4: Panel Unit Root Test 
 MPR REMIT LREMITT    REMIT LGDP CPI FDI 
LEVEL        
LLC -11.00*** 7.97*** -10.65*** -46.66*** -0.49828 47.57*** -11.18*** 
IPS -6.80*** -4.8*** -2.53*** -15.64*** 12.2972 54.97*** -13.35 
ADF 185.24*** 330.44*** 349.76*** 476.36*** 158.073 39.76*** 619.74*** 
PP 204.75*** 372.82*** 342.32*** 743.92*** 194.544 37.34*** 609.03*** 
FIRST DIFFERENCE      
LLC     -33.94*** -12.32***  
IPS     -34.29*** -14.65***  
ADF     1525.28*** 770.79***  
PP     1529.36*** 971.55***  
        
 LRATE REER RIR LCPI TRADE   
LEVEL        
LLC -17646.2*** -6.51*** -32.34*** -20.15*** -3.74***   
IPS  -3707.32*** -5.17*** -28.03*** -19.35*** -4.87***   
ADF 959.38*** 219.44*** 1048.70*** 1445.44*** 330.57***   
PP 1115.92*** 225.12*** 1132.33*** 1143.66*** 337.35***   
Note 1: LLC is Levine-Lin-Chu statistics; IPS is Im, Pesaran and Shin statistics; ADF is Augmented Dickey 
Fuller Fisher Chi-square statistics; PP is Phillips Perron statistics. 
Note 2: All variables are described in Table 1. 
Note 4: *** shows significance at the 1% level, and ** shows significance at the 5% level. 
 
3.5 Monetary Policy and Remittances 
We present the results of the PVAR in Table 5. The dependent variable for Model 1 is 
remittance as a ratio of GDP; the dependent variable for Models 2 to 8 is the central bank’s 
Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) used to capture the monetary policy stance and the prevailing 
interest rate. We include the five-year rolling standard deviation of consumer inflation instead 
of the CPI, as we view it as a better measure of macroeconomic (in)stability. Table 1 provides 
the description of variables.  
3.5.1 Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
Model (1) in Table 5 reveals that financial development (DCPS) is negatively related to 
remittances. This finding does not necessarily imply that financial development reduces 
remittance inflows. We offer two interpretations. The first interpretation is that a financial 
sector that is not well developed obstructs the flow of remittances by increasing both the 
monetary and non-monetary costs of sending and receiving remittances. The second 
interpretation is that remittances and financial markets play substitute roles in growth, which 
occurs when remittance recipients rely on migrants for ‘credit’ instead of the local financial 
system. This latter interpretation concurs with Brown et al. (2013).  
Remittances are largely self-driven, which is shown by the significance of the lag of 
remittances. Once migrants start sending money home, they have the propensity to continue 
sending money because they feel obliged to promote the welfare of the family and friends 
they left behind. In addition, monies sent back home to undertake projects are usually 
delivered incrementally and not in bulk. We further find that the size of the economy 
positively impacts the flow of remittances. In addition, our measure of economic business 
cycles, growth in GDP, has an inverse relationship with the inflow of remittances supporting 
the countercyclical view of remittances. However, this coefficient is not significant.  
Our alternative measure of foreign inflows, FDI, is negatively related to remittances, which 
suggests that FDI acts as an alternative source of international finance in reality. These two 
flows are underpinned by different characteristics, as described by Chami et al. (2008). 
Unlike other capital flows, remittances ignite family bonds. Second, these ignited familial 
relationships make remittances respond more to the needs of family members than standard 
private capital flows, which are largely driven by investment motives.  
 
3.5.1 Remittances and Monetary Policy – Dissecting the Evidence 
There is strong confirmation of a negative impact of remittances on the monetary policy rate 
that is evidenced by the statistical significance as well as the negative coefficient of the lag of
Table 5: Monetary Policy and Remittances 
 REMIT 
(1) 
MPR 
(2) 
MPR 
(3) 
MPR 
(4) 
MPR 
(5) 
MPR 
(6) 
MPR 
(7) 
MPR 
(8) 
REMIT(-1)  1.0208*** -0.1671*** -0.1075* -0.2456 -0.1783***    
  (0.0148)  (0.0572)  (0.0601)  (0.0484)  (0.0498)    
MPR(-1) -0.0093  0.2364***  0.2235***  0.1906***  0.1748***  0.6806***  0.1330***  0.1872*** 
  (0.0078)  (0.0301)  (0.0300)  (0.0256)  (0.0251)  (0.0363)  (0.0258)  (0.0253) 
σrLCPI (-1)  0.3623 -4.4956** -5.5559*** -4.1206*** -5.3386***  1.7243 -0.0510***  0.0005** 
  (0.5232)  (2.0267)  (2.0303)  (1.6930)  (1.6674)  (2.0462)  (0.0158)  (0.0003) 
DCPS(-1) -0.3778** -3.0653*** -2.9369*** -5.4937*** -5.3942*** -1.5309*** -4.0263*** -5.1504*** 
  (0.1433)  (0.5551)  (0.5484)  (0.5244)  (0.5083)  (0.3973)  (0.5339)  (0.5107) 
TRADE(-1)  0.0093*** -0.0304*** -0.0242** -0.0140 -0.0065 -0.0061 -0.0073 -0.0112 
  (0.0028)  (0.0108)  (0.0109)  (0.0092)  (0.0091)  (0.0059)  (0.0083)  (0.0087) 
REER(-1) -0.0005 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0039*** -0.0039*** -0.0005 -0.0042*** -0.0042*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0009)  (0.0013)  (0.0014) 
GDPg(-1) -0.0264 -0.0007 -0.0519 -0.0954 -0.1565* -0.0366 -0.0337 -0.0531 
  (0.0292)  (0.1129)  (0.1127)  (0.0948)  (0.0931)  (0.0605)  (0.0897)  (0.0940) 
LGDP(-1)  0.1109** -0.6886*** -0.7199*** -0.9090*** -0.9497*** -0.5200*** -0.7170*** -0.9086*** 
  (0.0450)  (0.1744)  (0.1721)  (0.1473)  (0.1430)  (0.0934)  (0.1465)  (0.1482) 
FDI(-1) -0.0716*** -0.0767 -0.0013  0.0279  0.1172  0.0080  0.1376* -0.0075 
  (0.0243)  (0.0943)  (0.0966)  (0.0794)  (0.0801)  (0.0504)  (0.0799)  (0.0807) 
REMIT.FD   -0.0597***  -0.0689*** -0.01625 -0.0477***  0.7545*** 
    (0.0210)   (0.0173)  (0.0109)  (0.0168)  (0.0771) 
MPR.FD     0.7021***  0.7163***  0.2858***  0.5865***  
    
 (0.0718)  (0.0687)  (0.0508)  (0.0759)  
σrREMIT      -0.2685*   
       (0.1454)   
σs REMIT       -0.1212***  
        (0.0508)  
σs 2REMIT        -0.0064*** 
         (0.0019) 
 R-squared  0.9609  0.4939  0.5115  0.6486  0.6720  0.8788  0.6705  0.6252 
 Adj. R-squared  0.9594  0.4735  0.4896  0.6328  0.6558  0.8725  0.6545  0.6087 
 F-statistic  612.1135***  24.2859***  23.3487***  41.1511***  41.3551***  138.4670***  41.8167***  37.8723*** 
Note 1: Remittances is the dependent variable for model (1), while the central bank’s monetary policy rate is the dependent variable for models (2) to (8). 
Note 2: MPR is Monetary Policy Rate; REMIT is Remittances as a ratio of GDP; GDPg is growth rate of GDP; σrREMIT is five-year rolling standard deviation of 
remittance inflows; σs REMIT is the (normal) standard deviation of remittances; σs 2REMIT is the (normal) variance of remittances; LGDP  is the log of Gross Domestic 
Product; σrLCPI is the five-year rolling standard deviation of the Consumer Price Index; FDI is Foreign Direct Investment; REER is the Real Effective Exchange Rate; 
TRADE is total trade as a ratio of GDP; DCPS Domestic Credit to Private Sector; REMIT.FD in an interactive term between remittances and financial development; 
MPR.FD is an interaction term between monetary policy (MPR) and financial development; σrMPR is five-year rolling standard deviation of MPR; σsMPR is (normal) 
standard deviation of MPR; and (-1) placed after a variable indicates the lag of the variable. 
Note 2: ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
  
Table 6: Remittance Risk and Monetary Policy Risk 
       
 σrREMIT σrMPR σrMPR σrMPR σrMPR σsMPR 
       σrREMIT (-1)  0.8961*** -0.1939** -0.1002 -0.1923** -0.1016  
  (0.0374)  (0.0929)  (0.0921)  (0.0937)  (0.0927)  
σrMPR (-1)  0.0417***  0.0022  0.0106  0.0019  0.0111  
  (0.0133)  (0.0331)  (0.0318)  (0.0333)  (0.0319)  
σrLCPI (-1) -0.7117  4.1068**  2.4999  4.1168**  2.4803  
  (0.7613)  (1.8898)  (1.8558)  (1.8965)  (1.8639)  
DCPS(-1) -0.1798** -0.6976*** -0.7489*** -0.6779*** -0.7719*** -4.0262*** 
  (0.0858)  (0.2131)  (0.2045)  (0.2436)  (0.2346)  (0.5339) 
TRADE(-1)  0.0049*** -0.0008  0.0035 -0.0008  0.0036 -0.0074 
  (0.0016)  (0.0041)  (0.0040)  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0083) 
REER(-1)  2.70E-05 -0.0012** -0.0012* -0.0012** -0.0011* -0.0042*** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0013) 
GDPg(-1) -0.0077 -0.0767* -0.1155** -0.0758** -0.1167*** -0.0337 
  (0.0163)  (0.0405)  (0.0399)  (0.0409)  (0.0405)  (0.0897) 
LGDP(-1)  0.0536**  0.1078  0.0942  0.1079  0.0939 -0.7171*** 
  (0.0276)  (0.0685)  (0.0657)  (0.0687)  (0.0659)  (0.1465) 
FDI(-1) -0.0194 -0.0187  0.0242 -0.0197  0.0256  0.1376* 
  (0.0144)  (0.0356)  (0.0358)  (0.0363)  (0.0366)  (0.0799) 
σsREMIT (-1)      -0.1212*** 
       (0.051) 
σsMPR (-1)       0.1330*** 
       (0.0258) 
σsLCPI (-1)      -0.0510*** 
       (0.0158) 
REMIT.FD   -0.0293***  -0.0295*** -0.04767*** 
    (0.0075)   (0.0075)  (0.0168) 
MPR.FD    -0.0055  0.0064  0.5865*** 
     (0.0328)  (0.0316)  (0.0759) 
 R-squared  0.8327  0.2922  0.3545  0.2922  0.3547  0.6705 
 Adj. R-squared  0.8234  0.2526  0.3142  0.2481  0.3100  0.6545 
 F-statistic  89.0788***  7.3838***  8.7877***  6.6082***  7.9447***  41.8167*** 
Note 1: Refer to notes under Table 5 for the description of variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
remittances in models 2, 3 and 5, as shown in Table 5. There are two explanations for this 
finding. First, an increase in remittances boosts the quantity of loanable funds available for 
lending in the economy, which may then lead to a decline in the interest rate. Second, when 
households receive remittances, their demand for formal credit will decline if the remittance 
received is large enough to meet their welfare and investment needs, which will cause interest 
rates to decline. This revelation is consistent with the prevailing wisdom based on single- and 
  
cross-country studies. For instance, using a DSGE model, Mandelman (2013) finds that 
remittance inflows reduced interest rate in the Philippines. In addition, Vacaflores (2012) 
employs a DSGE model and comes to the same conclusion in a panel of 11 Latin American 
countries. 
Our finding that remittances reduce domestic interest rate remains robust when remittances 
are measured in terms of five-year rolling standard deviation, normal standard deviation, and 
normal variance. This finding implies that the volatility of remittances helps to ease domestic 
interest conditions thereby helping to stabilise the macroeconomy. The ability of remittances 
to ensure output and macroeconomic stability stems from the capability of remittances to 
reduce volatilities in consumption and investment (Craigwell et al., 2010). We will further 
discuss the macroeconomic implications of remittances in the next section. 
As expected, a rise in each of the following causes the policy rate to fall: financial 
development, real effective exchange rate, economic openness and size. This finding suggests 
that if developing countries can improve and sustain macroeconomic gains, they can improve 
the effectiveness of their monetary policies. An effective monetary policy will promote the 
growth and income of the populace. As the income of the citizenry rises, their demand 
increases for goods and services, including financial assets, which opens up more space for 
monetary policy management. In addition, a more favourable exchange rate is conducive for 
monetary policy management. 
3.5.2 Does Monetary Policy Volatility Affect Remittance Volatility? 
The volatility of monetary policy or interest rates has an adverse impact on economic growth. 
Therefore, central banks worldwide seek to stabilise monetary conditions to ensure 
macroeconomic stability. Model 1 under Table 6 shows the effect of policy rate volatility on 
the variation in remittance inflows. An increase in monetary policy volatility tends to 
decrease remittance volatility. This finding is consistent with the countercyclical properties of 
remittances, which are derived from the altruism theory of remittance. When macroeconomic 
conditions in the receiving country are unfavourable, we expect an increase in remittance 
inflows, and we expect the reverse when macroeconomic conditions improve. Migrants are 
considered sensitive to the plight of their families back home and often offer a helping hand 
when conditions in the home country hit their family members hard. This finding also 
confirms the widely held view that the macroeconomic environment in the receiving country 
affects migrants’ remitting behaviour. The countercyclical properties of remittances have 
  
been confirmed by Craigwell et al. (2010), Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011), and Adenutsi 
(2014).  
We further find that an advanced financial system reduces remittance volatility. In addition, 
an increase in economic openness tends to decrease the variability in remittance flows. 
However, as the domestic economy expands, remittance volatility also increases. 
3.5.3 Do Remittances Constitute an Additional Macroeconomic Risk? 
We report the impact of remittance uncertainty on monetary policy risk (measured as the 
rolling and normal standard deviation of the policy rate) in Table 6. The results from the 
second column to the last column are provided with monetary policy risk as the dependent 
variable. Remittance volatility tends to reduce monetary policy riskiness. The finding is fairly 
consistent in the majority of our models and is consistent with one of the established 
regularities in the empirical literature, that unlike other capital flows such as official 
development assistance, FDI and private portfolio flows, remittances are countercyclical and 
can act as a buffer for macroeconomic stability for that matter. By smoothening consumption, 
for instance, remittances help raise economic activity during hard times and reduce business 
cycle effects (Singer, 2010). The macroeconomic risk-mitigating impact of remittances 
remains robust, whether we measure remittance volatility as a five-year moving standard 
deviation or as normal standard deviation. Previous research on the macroeconomic 
implications of remittances reached similar conclusions. For instance, in a study of 69 
economies, Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011) confirm a negative link between remittances and 
output volatility. In addition, Craigwell et al. (2010) support the role of remittances in taming 
macroeconomic shocks in a panel of 95 countries. The ability of remittances to ameliorate 
macroeconomic risk arises from the low procyclical nature, increasing size and stability of 
remittances relative to other types of capital flows.  
3.5.4 Dissecting the Role of Financial Development in the Remittance-Monetary Policy 
Nexus 
Financial markets contribute to economic progress by enhancing efficiency and risk sharing, 
monitoring managerial actions to prevent fraud, harnessing and channelling savings to viable 
projects, and by reducing the cost of access to financing. If these properties of financial 
markets hold, then our financial development variable must be negatively related to the 
monetary policy rate or to the domestic interest rate. Table 5 shows that the financial 
development variable (DCPS) is consistently negative and significant for models 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
  
and 8, which means that a well-developed financial sector will lead to a lower monetary 
policy rate and hence a lower domestic interest rate. A well-developed financial system offers 
a wider scope for monetary policy than an immature system. This finding dovetails with the 
findings by Krause and Rioja (2006) that financial market development promotes monetary 
policy efficiency. Table 6 further shows that financial development lessens macroeconomic 
risk by reducing volatility in the policy rate. This result is quite robust, as it is consistent in all 
of the model specifications.  
Additionally, the remittance-finance interactive term is significant and has a negative sign in 
models 3, 5, 7 and 8 in Table 5, which means that finance complements the stabilising effect 
of remittances on macroeconomic variables. According to Agbloyor et al. (2014) and 
Osabuohien and Efobi (2013), financial markets play a moderating role between capital flows 
and growth. In doing so, financial markets augment the positive effects of capital flows on 
the economy while hindering any negative impact. This finding highlights the need for policy 
reform in developing countries to make financial markets more efficient. The interactive term 
between remittances and finance is also significant in minimising macroeconomic risk 
(policy volatility) as shown in the results presented in Table 6. The robust nature of this 
finding should be of consequence to macroeconomic policy. 
3.6 The Effects of a Contractionary Monetary Policy on Remittance Inflows  
A key unresolved issue in measuring monetary shocks is the specification of a contractionary 
or expansionary monetary policy. Conventionally, a rise in the short-term interest rate or a 
fall in monetary aggregates is interpreted as a contractionary monetary policy. In this regard, 
the recursive Cholesky approach is used to identify monetary shocks. However, Ho and Yeh 
(2010) argue that this identification may be suitable only with respect to a closed economy. 
They argue that in a closed economy, the interest rate is the main instrument of monetary 
policy, such that a policy tightening may cause the short-run interest rate to fall. However, for 
an open economy in which there are large interventions in the forex market, a tight policy 
may be captured by a rise in interest rates or a reduction in foreign reserves.  
A sign restriction methodology, as proposed by Uhlig (2005), can be employed to identify 
different contractionary monetary policy identification schemes. Alternative sign restrictions 
schemes have been implemented with varying degrees of success. First, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) implement a scheme that assumes that when there is a contractionary 
monetary shock, the short-term interest rate will not fall. Second, Gordon and Leeper (1994) 
  
use a scheme based on the assumption that a contractionary monetary policy will not lead to a 
rise in monetary aggregates. A third identification scheme combines the first two. The fourth 
scheme views monetary contraction as innovations in both the interest rate and the exchange 
rate. The fifth alternative scheme captures monetary policy innovations as a decrease in 
money supply, an appreciation of the domestic currency, and an increase in the interest rate 
(Mountford, 2005). The sixth scheme posits that a tightening of monetary policy will not 
cause interest rates to fall or foreign reserves to rise (Ho and Yeh, 2010). Rafiq and Mallick 
(2008) use the seventh alternative identification scheme by employing data for three 
European countries, and the restrictions in this scheme are based on the standard Mundell–
Fleming–Dornbusch model, which stipulates that tight monetary policy will cause interest 
rates to rise and the real exchange rate to appreciate, while causing prices, money supply, and 
real output to fall. 
Ho and Yeh (2010) find that identification schemes one to five suffer from one or more of 
price, liquidity and/or exchange rate puzzles. The price puzzle arises when a tight monetary 
policy causes the price level to rise instead of causing the price level to fall. In the case of the 
liquidity puzzle, positive innovations in monetary policy cause interest rates to rise instead of 
depressing them. With the exchange rate puzzle, a tight monetary policy shock leads to a 
depreciation – instead of an appreciation – of the currency. Only schemes six (Ho and Yeh, 
2010) and seven (Rafiq and Mallick, 2008) avoid all of the puzzles. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we follow scheme seven (the Mundell-Flemin-Dorbusch 
model) and specify a contractionary monetary policy as a one-unit positive shock to the 
interest rate (MPR), a one-unit positive shock to the exchange rate, a one-unit negative shock 
to inflation, a one-unit negative shock to GDP, a one-unit negative shock to money supply, 
and a one-unit positive shock to GDP growth. The inclusion of a shock to GDP growth is to 
control for supply shocks to prevent misidentification. The impulse responses from Cholesky 
and Generalised Impulse Responses are shown in Figure 1. The associated accumulated 
responses are shown in Figure 2. Both the Cholesky and the Generalised Impulse Responses 
in Figure 1 show that a contractionary monetary shock leads to a steady rise in remittance 
inflows. This finding implies that remittances can frustrate contractionary monetary policies 
if not properly anticipated. If properly anticipated, remittances can serve as pseudo automatic 
stabilisers and can substitute for monetary policy. This result is consistent with Singer (2010), 
who argues that in a trilemma policy framework, remittances can substitute for loss of 
  
monetary independence based on their stabilising and countercyclical properties and allow 
economies to implement fixed exchange rate regimes. The results from the accumulated 
responses in Figure 2 are more definite. A contractionary monetary shock causes a persistent 
rise in remittance inflows. It is therefore safe to conclude that monetary tightening causes a 
rise in remittance inflows.  
 
Figure 1: Response of Remittances to Contractionary Monetary Policy 
 
 
Figure 2: Response of Remittances to Monetary Contraction – Accumulated Response 
3.7 Further Robustness Checks 
We performed further robustness checks against measurement error and misspecification. 
First, instead of the monetary policy rate, we used the lending rate as an alternative proxy for 
monetary policy because the lending rate responds to changes in the policy rate. The 
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correlation between the two variables is approximately 73.54%. Second, we used the log of 
total remittances instead of remittances as a proportion of GDP.
  
Table 7: Remittances and Monetary Policy (Lending Interest Rate) 
 σr 2REMITT σr 2LRATE σr 2LCPI TRADE FDI DCPS REER MONEY_FRE
EDOM 
         σr 2REMITT (-1)  0.6066*** -0.2957*  4.93E-06 -0.0304  0.0069  0.0015*  0.0153 -0.0266 
  (0.0294)  (0.1559)  (9.6E-05)  (0.0510)  (0.0255)  (0.0009)  (0.0727)  (0.0257) 
σr 2LRATE (-1) -0.0003  0.1620***  4.45E-06*** -0.0003 -0.0001  6.34E-06 -0.0006  0.00027 
  (0.0004)  (0.0019)  (1.2E-06)  (0.0006)  (0.0003)  (1.1E-05)  (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
σr 2LCPI (-1) -3.5819  17.9678  0.8603***  7.4905 -0.7893 -0.1960  27.0516*** -33.6473*** 
  (4.6751)  (24.7993)  (0.0153)  (8.1154)  (4.0479)  (0.1374)  (11.5601)  (4.0783) 
TRADE(-1)  0.0183***  0.0139 -8.46E-06  0.9749***  0.0074  0.0002  0.0046  0.0043 
  (0.0058)  (0.0307)  (1.9E-05)  (0.0100)  (0.0050)  (0.0002)  (0.0143)  (0.0050) 
FDI(-1) -0.0159 -0.0199  9.26E-05 -0.0009  0.58262***  0.0001  0.201052* -0.0315 
  (0.0429)  (0.2275)  (0.0001)  (0.0744)  (0.0371)  (0.0013)  (0.1060)  (0.0374) 
DCPS(-1) -0.0119 -0.5817  0.0005 -0.4721 -0.2016  0.9175*** -0.6407 -0.0559 
  (0.4401)  (2.3346)  (0.0014)  (0.7639)  (0.3811)  (0.0129)  (1.0882)  (0.3839) 
REER(-1) -0.0347*** -0.0798 -0.0001***  0.0098 -0.0005  0.0003  0.8319***  0.00716 
  (0.0097)  (0.0517)  (3.2E-05)  (0.0169)  (0.0084)  (0.0004)  (0.0241)  (0.0085) 
MONEY_FREEDOM(-1) -0.0554 -0.8664***  0.0006***  0.0463 -0.0035 -0.0004  0.0762  0.6573*** 
  (0.0339)  (0.1801)  (0.0001)  (0.0589)  (0.0294)  (0.0010)  (0.0839)  (0.0296) 
DREMITM  1.5210*** -2.9587 -3.07E-05 -0.1562  0.34435 -0.0158 -0.3477  0.4131 
  (0.4547)  (2.4123)  (0.0015)  (0.7894)  (0.3937)  (0.0134)  (1.1244)  (0.3968) 
FINCDEVM -0.9702 -7.3643* -0.0016  0.9350  0.5603  0.1056***  0.6661  0.1823 
  (0.7151)  (3.7933)  (0.0023)  (1.2413)  (0.6192)  (0.0210)  (1.7682)  (0.6238) 
C  6.6956**  88.5848*** -0.0349*** -0.5903  1.5654  0.2408***  10.7789  25.4876*** 
  (2.7809)  (14.7516)  (0.0091)  (4.8274)  (2.4079)  (0.0817)  (6.8764)  (2.4259) 
 R-squared  0.6033  0.9411  0.9218  0.9628  0.3804  0.9714  0.7407  0.7804 
 Adj. R-squared  0.5950  0.9399  0.9201  0.9620  0.3674  0.9708  0.7352  0.7758 
 Sum sq. resids  9501.0430  267341.6  0.1018  28629.31  7122.687  8.2044  58091.36  7230.140 
 S.E. equation  4.4629  23.6741  0.0146  7.7472  3.864228  0.1311  11.0356  3.8933 
 F-statistic  72.5522  762.1170  562.0185  1235.067  29.28925  1620.008  136.2276  169.4904 
 Log likelihood -1416.839 -2231.098  1375.394 -1685.979 -1346.539  304.4558 -1858.629 -1350.192 
 Akaike AIC  5.8518  9.18893 -5.5918  6.9548  5.56368 -1.2027  7.6624  5.5787 
 Schwarz SC  5.9463  9.2834 -5.4973  7.0493  5.6581 -1.1082  7.7569  5.6731 
Note: σs 2LRATE is the five-year rolling variance of the Lending Interest Rate; REER is the Real Effective Exchange Rate; TRADE is total trade as a proportion 
of GDP; DCPS is Domestic Credit to Private Sector; FINCDEVM is a financial development dummy equal to 1 (high financial development) if a country’s 
financial development exceeds the median level of financial development and zero otherwise (low financial development); DREMITM is a remittance dummy 
equal to 1 (high remittance receiving country) when a country’s remittance receipts exceed the median level and zero otherwise (low remittance receiving 
country); MONEY_FREEDOM is monetary freedom; and (-1) placed after a variable indicates the lag of the variable. The figures in parentheses are standard 
errors.
  
Using the logs helps reduce variability and minimises possible heteroscedastic tendencies. 
Third, instead of using standard deviation we used a five-year rolling variance as a measure 
of risk. Fourth, we included a dummy for financial development (FINCDEVM) based on the 
median level of financial development. FINCDEVM equals 1 (high financial development) 
when a country’s financial development is above the median level of financial development 
and zero otherwise (low financial development). In addition, we examined whether the 
amount of remittances received matters by including a remittance dummy (DREMITM). 
DREMITM equals 1 (high remittance receiving countries) when a country’s remittance 
receipts exceed the median level and zero otherwise (low remittance receiving countries). 
Finally, we included a new variable, monetary freedom (MONEY_FREEDOM), to test for 
possible omitted variable bias. We report the results of the PVAR estimation in Table 7.  
In the first column in which the variance of remittances is the dependent variable, the 
financial development variable (DCPS) is no longer significant after accounting for the level 
of financial development. However, the financial development dummy is negative and 
significant. This finding remains robust after controlling for the amount of remittance 
received. This can be explained by noting that in countries with shallow financial markets – 
where the cost of credit in the formal circuit is high and access is limited – households rely 
upon remittances as an alternative mode of finance. This understanding dovetails with our 
previous conclusion that remittances can serve as a substitute for bank credit when the 
financial system is underdeveloped. The economic openness variable (TRADE) remains 
positive and significant as shown earlier. The real effective exchange rate (REER) also 
remains significantly negative.  
In the second column in which the variance of the lending rate is the dependent variable, the 
variance of remittances is significant and negative after accounting for the level of 
remittances and the level of financial advancement. This result supports the previous finding 
that remittances help to mitigate macroeconomic volatility. In addition, the remittance 
dummy is not significant, implying that the macroeconomic smoothening effect of 
remittances pertains in both low- and high-remittance receiving countries. From our 
robustness checks, we can fairly conclude that the results of this study are robust to 
alternative specifications of remittances, monetary policy and financial development. 
 
  
 
1. CONCLUSIONS 
Remittances continue to play an increasingly important role in developing countries and are 
becoming a dominant source of development finance, which has implications for 
macroeconomic policy. We find a complex web of relationships among remittances, 
monetary policy and financial markets. Notably, both remittances and remittance volatility 
tend to reduce both the monetary policy rate and monetary policy volatility. First, this finding 
implies that in the presence of remittances, the domestic interest rate becomes downward 
biased; in other words, remittance inflows will lead to favourable reductions in domestic 
interest rates, thereby reducing financing costs. Second, remittances are countercyclical and 
have a smoothening effect on macroeconomic magnitudes, which means that the presence of 
remittances can reduce macroeconomic fluctuations, thereby creating favourable economic 
conditions for the pursuit of policies that deliver shared prosperity.  
This paper highlights the important role played by the financial sector in the remittance-
monetary policy nexus. We find that financial development helps to reduce monetary policy 
risk through its interaction with remittances. This finding supports earlier studies that endorse 
the moderating role of financial markets in the finance-growth relationship ( see, Agbloyor et 
al., 2014; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013). However, we establish a negative association 
between financial development and remittances. Our robustness checks help us explain this 
finding to mean that in countries with weak financial systems, the high cost of sending and 
receiving remittances obstructs remittance inflows. In addition, in undeveloped financial 
markets, domestic residents rely on their offshore benefactors as an alternative source of 
income.  
Our simulation of contractionary monetary policy reveals that contractionary monetary 
impulses engineer a persistent inflow of remittances. We believe this finding is relevant in 
terms of formulating monetary policy. Central banks ought to factor this behaviour of 
remittances into their policy decisions and may have to think about sterilisation (when 
required) to achieve the desired policy outcomes. 
These findings imply that one of the ways developing countries can diminish monetary policy 
risks is to pursue policies that facilitate remittance inflows. Such policies should be geared 
towards reducing the cost of sending and receiving remittances by providing innovative 
  
financial products for remittance senders and recipients alike and by encouraging the use of 
formal channels for transmitting remittances.  
Our findings are largely robust to an alternative specification of remittances and monetary 
policy, when additional explanatory variables are included and after controlling for the level 
of financial development and the level of remittances received.  
This work corroborates earlier studies on the finance-growth nexus by Bugamelli and 
PaternÒ (2011) and Craigwell et al. (2010). However, although these studies establish a 
relationship between remittance volatility and output volatility (an indirect outcome of 
monetary policy), we assess the impact of remittance volatility on a direct measure of 
monetary policy – the monetary policy rate and its volatility.  
Our paper extends the literature on international capital flows and macroeconomic stability 
by using a panel vector approach to establish the impact of remittance and its volatility on 
domestic monetary conditions. We contribute to the advancement of theory by simulating the 
impact of a contractionary monetary policy based on the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush 
hypothesis. The impulse responses generated allowed us to understand the behaviour of 
remittances in the presence of domestic monetary policy shocks. In conclusion, this study, 
while supporting earlier findings, offers new insights into the link between migrant 
remittances and macroeconomic stability.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: List of Countries Included in the Study 
1. Algeria 21. China 41. Guyana 
 
61. Moldova 81. Samoa 101. Uganda 
2. Antigua and 
Barbuda 
22. Colombia 42. Honduras 
 
62. Mongolia 82. Sao Tome 
and Principe 
102. Ukraine 
3. Argentina 23. Congo 
Republic 
43. Hungary 
 
63. Morocco 83. Senegal 103. Vanuatu 
4. Armenia 24. Costa Rica 44. India 64. Mozambique 84. Seychelles 104. 
Venezuela, 
RB 
5. Azerbajan 25. Cote d'Ivoire 45. Indonesia 65. Namibia 85. Sierra 
Leone 
105. Vietnam 
6. Bangladesh 26. Croatia 46. Iran 66. Nepal 86. Solomon 
Islands 
106. Yemen 
7. Barbados 27. Djibouti 47. Jamaica 67. Nicaragua 87. South 
Africa 
 
8. Belarus 28. Dominica 48. Jordan 68. Niger 88. Sri Lanka  
9. Belize 29. Dominican 
Republic 
49. Kazakhstan 69. Nigeria 89. St. Lucia   
10. Benin 30. Equador 50. Kenya 70. Oman 90. St. 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 
 
11. Bolivia 31. Egypt 51. Kyrgyz 
Republic 
71. Parkistan 91. Sudan  
12. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
32. El Salvador 52. Lao PDR 72. Panama 92. Suriname  
13. Botswana 33. Ethiopia 53. Latvia 73. Papua New 
Guinea 
93. Tajikistan  
14. Brazil 34. Fiji 54. Lesotho 74. Paraguay 94. Tanzania  
15. Bulgaria 35. Georgia 55. Macedonia, 
FYR 
75. Peru 95. Thailand  
16. Burkina Faso 36. Ghana 56. Malawi 76. Philippines 96. Togo  
17. Burundi 37. Grenada 57. Malaysia 77. Poland 97. Tonga  
18. Cabo Verde 38. Guatemala 58. Maldives 78. Romania 98. Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 
19. Cambodia 39. Guinea 59. Mali 79. Russia 99. Tunisia  
20. Cameroon 40. Guinea-Bissau 
 
60. Mexico 80. Rwanda 100. Turkey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
